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WOMEN
left, right and
CENTRE
\e conventional political picture has a spectrum Left to 
light, 'collectivism' to 'individualism'. Carol Bacchi 
claims the picture is of little use for feminists. Both 
'collectivism' and ' individualism' have their problems and
their possibilities.
he events in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe have dominated 
political analysis for the last year. 
Seldom is it mentioned that these 
dramatic events may be experienced by women in 
ways not experienced by men. A few feminist 
voices have drawn attention to the difficulties 
faced by women who have lost social supports 
such as paid maternity leave and reliable child 
care, but these voices attract little attention. The 
fact that the arrival of democracy in Poland and 
East Germany has also meant the removal of or 
diminished access to abortion is also seldom dis­
cussed.
The major organising principles for political analysis, both 
in A ustralia and overseas, are based on econom ic 
categories. Our 'ideologies' (used descriptively here to refer 
to packages of political beliefs usually portrayed as fixed 
and consistent), revolve around disputes about whether 
'society' is better served by allowing 'individuals' to com­
pete, or whether some form of collective provision is 
desirable. In one or other countries at different times, the 
pendulum is said to have swung towards the 'individualist' 
or 'collectivist' end of the spectrum. And we all know that 
'collectivism' is on the wane worldwide right now.
The major political actors in this drama (and I am using 
'acting' metaphors deliberately, knowing Shakespeare 
would understand) have historically been 'classes', though 
everyone admits these are becoming harder and harder to 
identify. More commonly, there is reference to 'employers',
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'unions', and the 'state'. In 'liberal' countries the 'free 
market7 reigns and in socialist ones we used to have 'ad­
ministered economies'.
I am not disputing some correspondence between these 
terms and the economic systems described; I am emphasis­
ing how this way of describing social and political life has 
formed the background of political analysis to date. The 
dominant ideological categories have been liberalism or 
socialism or something in between. The ends of the 
ideological spectrum have been labelled individualism and 
collectivism, and regimes are characterised along this con­
tinuum.
Women's needs then have been interpreted within this 
ideological spectrum. And, in certain cases at certain times, 
women have made some gains. It is clear, for example, that 
middle-class women at the end of the nineteenth century 
in countries which espoused a commitment to 'individual 
rights' (i.e. most Western democracies) were able to claim 
access to these 'rights' as 'individuals'. It took time and the 
battle was necessary and worthwhile.
There were sticking points, however, which indicated the 
kinds of problems which came up when women demanded 
access to existing categories. Some could see that single 
women certainly had a claim to political representation. But 
married women? Were they not already represented 
through their husbands? Since representation had been tied 
to property and since married women's property became 
their husbands' on marriage, on what grounds could they 
be enfranchised? We now know that the resolution was to 
extend individual property ownership to married women 
and so the vote was won.
Women now possessed individual 'rights' identical to men. 
The fact that most women continued to fill the role of wife 
and mother and that this meant less time to exerdse these 
'rights' was not addressed. Nor was the fact that the threat 
of physical violence within and outside the home imposed 
constraints on any meaningful exercise of 'rights'.
On the other side, in regimes where the state assumed 
greater responsibility for the economic welfare of its 
citizens, women had other successes. The most obvious 
here have been social supports for maternity, in particular 
paid maternity leave of some variety. Women gained these 
benefits as a by-product of an approach to community 
welfare which emphasised national health and efficiency. 
Here they were not 'individuals' but 'reproducers' of 
'manpower'. Where this has been the case, the claim by 
women to some form of independent existence has been 
difficult to make. Women are either 'individuals' and their 
maternity is ignored, or they are mothers and their 
'individuality' is downplayed.
The next point, and it is a key one, is that these ideologies 
are more ambiguous in their implications for women than 
the theory contends. It is a too easy assumption that a 
country with a more progressive political ideology, com­
mitted to a greater social equality, will necessarily deal 
successfully with gender inequality. In fact, the commit­
ment to the former can undermine the latter. The conviction 
that the only important social groups are classes and that 
social equality means only a redistribution of wealth 
among them leaves women and some of their problems, in 
particular their stigmatisation and terrorisation, invisible.
None of this is meant to imply that countries which hesitat­
ingly grant women group status and admit through legis­
lative recognition that violence impedes their individual
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growth offer an ideal world. As stated at the outset, the 
problem is the way in which women are offered either/or 
choices where neither on its own is adequate.
Moreover, these contrasting ideologies are themselves 
tools in political debate and as such actively construct the 
conceptual terrain within which political battles take place. 
The conceptual territory has been occupied and women are 
forced to wage ideological skirmishes on that terrain (the 
military metaphors are here intended). When 'sexual 
equality' comes onto the political agenda, therefore, it is 
always already delimited in particular ways.
This proposition needs to be pursued by identifying the 
approaches taken to sexual equality in different political 
regimes and circumstances, teasing out the meanings be­
hind these approaches and the way in which they are 
actively pursued in policy. Why did sexual equality come 
onto the political agenda, what explanations were offered 
to explain the problem and what were the repercussions of 
adopting each particular explanation? A few examples of 
the kind of analysis I am suggesting will be offered here.
The most common and widespread explanation of 
women's disadvantage to emerge in the 1960s with the 
resurgence of Western feminism was sex role theory. In 
brief this was an adaptation of socialisation theory which 
said that people behaved in particular ways because they 
were brought up to behave in those ways. The education 
system, representation in the media, and the attitudes of 
parents combined to encourage boys to pursue careers and 
girls to plan on motherhood. People were more or less 
'trapped' within these roles and the way to offer women 
more opportunities was to challenge them through non­
sexist literature and a more open education.
Now this explanation of affairs was eagerly accepted by 
many feminists of most ideological persuasions. The 
reason was obvious. Until that time women had had to 
contend with the proposition that their destiny was 
biologically determined. Sex role theory at least opened up 
the chance for change!
What is interesting here is to see how this theory came to 
be understood in contrasting political regimes—regimes, 
that is to say, at very different points of the 'spectrum' 
between collectivism and individualism. Here my ex­
amples are America and Sweden. What is most significant, 
perhaps—and will hopefully become apparent as my 
analysis proceeds—is the way in which many of the same 
problems occur in the sex equality and other professedly 
pro-women's legislation and institutions in the two 
countries, regardless of their different ideological under­
pinnings. At the same time, while the 'more individualistic' 
approach has severe drawbacks in terms of social 
provision and welfare for women, the 'more collectivist' 
approach, with its emphasis on social solidarity and co­
operation, tends to blur over the real sites of conflict be­
tween men and women as individuals. Neither ideology, 
in other words, is unambiguously 'good' or 'bad' for 
women.
In America, sex roles were described as unnatural con­
straints on 'individual' behaviour. This, it was explained, 
could not be a good thing since each woman should have 
the 'opportunity' to explore her 'individual' 'potential'. It 
was assum ed that m ost men already had this 
'opportunity'. The understanding then was that no evil 
was involved in women's inequality and there was no real 
need to address women's problems as a group. All that was 
required was to loosen up the ideological constraints to 
allow women to follow their individual paths to 'success'.
Sex role theory was and continues to be even more popular 
in Sweden, a country which until recently has been 
dominated by social democratic governments. Social 
democracy, many would agree, is a little difficult to place 
on the indivdualism-collectivism continuum. It is certainly 
clear, for example, that alongside the willingness to use the 
state to provide an extensive system of welfare, social 
democracy makes a strong rhetorical commitment to in­
dividual development. Sex role theory was popular there­
fore for reasons similar to those in America since it 
promised to free people to explore that potential.
There was an added twist to the way in which sex role 
theory came to be discussed there, however. The Swedish 
model has been described as one based upon consensus, 
not conflict, co-operation, not confrontation. Here, ap­
propriately, it was emphasised that men as well as women 
were trapped in constricting roles—that men should be 
freer to choose to spend more time with their children, for 
example. The broadening of sex roles, it was explained, 
would benefit everyone.
The tone in the explanation is conciliatory. There is no 
suggestion that men would have any reason to oppose the 
eradication of sexual equality since there would be no 
losers. The message was nicely captured in the title of a 
government publication endorsing sexual equality—Side 
by Side (1985).
I
In America, sex role theory was interpreted as a means of 
releasing individual creativity; in Sweden it was seen as 
contributing to solidarity. In neither place were the specific 
problems faced by women and the complex reasons for 
these given adequate attention.
The logical flow-on from sex role analysis was gender- 
neutral language, and this appeared both in America and 
in Sweden. In America the promises of formal, procedural 
equality were extended to women as well as men, through 
the introduction of civil rights legislation which meant that 
the law would now be race and sex 'blind'. In Sweden, 
equality legislation was pushed through by the bourgeois 
parties, stipulating that "...the aim of this Act is to promote 
the equality between men and women in respect of 
employment, conditions of employment and oppor­
tunities for development in employment (equality at 
work)' (1980). Attempts by feminists to have some verbal 
acknowledgment in the legislation that women were the 
ones facing discrimination failed.
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Sex role theory and gender-neutral language allowed 
women's issues to be seen to be dealt with, while severely 
limiting the kinds of reforms which were proposed. In 
A m erica, in d iv id u alistic  rhetoric left w om en as 
'individuals'; in Sweden, the rhetoric of consensus and 
solidarity left them 'side by side' with men.
In America, women as a category were tacked onto civil 
rights legislation designed originally to placate civil rights 
activists campaigning on behalf of blacks as a category. The 
amendment to the 1964 Civil Rights Bill extending its 
provisions to women was proposed by a southerner who 
felt that the addition of gender would lead to the bill's 
defeat. The defence of legislation targetting groups, which 
became grounds for the introduction of affirmative action, 
was mounted within the constraints of an 'individualistic' 
commitment to equal opportunity. The argument was that 
the offer of equal opportunity was meaningless if a group 
is stigmatised and that group identity clouds their in­
dividual chances of success. More recently, the political 
climate, determined by particular political actors, has 
swung against that interpretation.
In Sweden, demands for positive action for women are 
vigorously resisted, despite the theoretical presumption 
that a more interventionist/collectivist regime would be 
more willing to institute reforms aimed at 'equality of 
result'. The strength of the corporatist model there, with 
employers and unions the primary social actors, meant 
that, when equality legislation was introduced, it specified 
that requirements for positive action for equality only be 
monitored and evaluated by the government if no collec­
tive agreement on the matter existed. Positive action is also 
described as confrontationist, undermining the consensus 
model. And these arguments are often supplemented by a 
daim, familiar to those of us in less 'collectivist7 regimes, 
that merit is what counts and that merit is easily, objectively 
ascertainable. Arguments are hauled out from different 
and seemingly opposed ideologies to protect the social 
sexual status quo.
'Sexual liberation' was another catch-phrase popular in the 
60s. In both America and Sweden there was a diminishing 
of the taboo against sexuality, though Sweden was reputed 
to be making the running in this domain. In both places the 
notion was tied to the idea of individual development 
which ideally would now be available to both women and 
men. The double moral standard was declared obsolete 
and women granted the 'freedom' to explore their sexual 
natures.
Women were able, as in previous periods, to use this politi­
cal opening to make some gains. So, in America, the 'right' 
to abortion was won in Roe v. Wade as part of a woman's 
'individual' 'right' to 'privacy7. Swedish women had an 
even easier time securing access to abortion as a necessary 
corollary to their new sexual 'freedom'. Contraceptive 
'rights' were also expanded in both countries.
Particular cultural and political factors, however, affected 
and continue to affect the meaning of sexual liberation for 
women. In America the influence of the Evangelical Right 
means that some issues, such as abortion, continually recur
on the political agenda. In Sweden, the move to reduce 
criminal penalties and the belief that men and women 
share the responsibility for sexual acts resulted in a reform 
commission recommendation in 1976 that the woman's 
actions ought to be taken into account when considering 
the seriousness of the offence of rape. For example, if a 
woman followed a man home, she would, under the 
proposal, be held partially responsible for the assault.
The new 'relaxed' attitude to sexuality compounded the 
problem of pornography and made it difficult for women 
to challenge it without appearing to be 'prudes'. This is 
true both inSweden and in America. And in both countries 
the issue is debated in terms of 'freedom' of the press, 
rather than the effects upon women. In America the prob­
lem is exacerbated by having this freedom enshrined in the 
Constitution in a culture where constitutionality is next to 
godliness.
It has been easier to raise issues of violence against women 
in America, partly because it is possible to argue that 
violence constrains women's access to freedom and in­
dividual development. In Sweden, by contrast, the em­
phasis on consensus and co-operation has created an 
environment where it is difficult to broach the subjects of 
sexual harassment and domestic violence. These issues 
have also been given a low priority because sexual equality 
is seen primarily as a labour market issue, given the need 
for an increased birth rate and increased female labour 
force participation.
On one side of the ocean 'classical liberalism' is used to 
curtail a whole range of reforms which women need; on 
the other side 'sodal democracy7 throws up a different 
array of obstades. In each case ideological prindples be­
come tools to shape the discourse in ways which put out 
of bounds issues which have to be addressed.
What does this mean insofar as strategy is concerned? 
Clearly, women need to take their chances where they find 
them, exploiting the cracks and fissures in the respective 
political settings. And, as in the past, this will indude the 
tactic of demanding reforms which fit within the dedared 
ideological commitment, be it to individual rights or com­
munity welfare.
There is also a conceptual battle to be waged, however. 
Feminists need to point out how women's demands il­
lustrate the inadequacy of available analytic precepts. 
They also need to recognise and remember that, when 
feminists appear to be in dispute or in disagreement, or 
when they find themselves puzzling over why it seems 
impossible to dedde between the pursuit of 'rights' or 
recognition of maternal needs, it is not feminists or women 
who are at fault. As long as women remain an afterthought 
in political theory and in the political arena, these sorts of 
dilemmas will arise. The chief demand therefore is for a 
reworking of the conceptual landscape to indude women 
as sodal actors.
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